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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 brought with 
it a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), based on the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The new WTO 
DSU has been heralded as the anchor of the rule-based multilateral trading system 
and one of the crowning achievements of the Uruguay Round. It has transformed 
the power-based dispute settlement system under the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into a rule-oriented system for the judicial settlement 
of trade disputes. The current WTO dispute settlement process, in contrast to the 
1947 system, is time-efficient and strictly regulated. Moreover, the introduction of 
the reverse consensus principle for adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports 
and authorization of retaliation solved the problem of individual Member 
blockage that had existed under the GATT.  
The WTO DSM derives its unique power as an international dispute 
settlement body from its exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction on matters arising 
under WTO agreements, its virtually automatic process, and its decisions’ 
economic impact. Many trade quarrels have been resolved through this 
mechanism, and it has proven to be a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the current multilateral trading system. 
Active and effective use of the WTO DSM can help preserve a Member’s 
economic and trade interests. Moreover, participation in the WTO DSM is 
essential for shaping the interpretation and application of WTO law over time. 
While the WTO DSM does not formally adopt a common law approach, 
Appellate Body and panel reliance on and citation of past WTO jurisprudence 
suggest WTO law’s common law orientation.1 
After fifteen years of negotiation, China officially became the 143rd WTO 
Member on 11 December 2001, an outsized economy submitting to the exclusive 
and compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
Notably, the WTO DSB is the only international ‘court’ of compulsory 
jurisdiction that China has recognized without reservation, and remains the only 
international judicial body to which China has resorted.2  
                                                              
1  Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, ICTSD Resource Paper No. 5 (2003), 
p. 11. 
2 China ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States in 1993, but submits to the jurisdiction of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) only those disputes concerning compensation for 
expropriation and nationalization. In 1972, the People’s Republic of China notified the UN 
Secretary-General that it did not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), which the Republic of China had accepted in 1946. 
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This article shows how a major developing country has fared in the WTO 
dispute settlement system by examining China’s participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism from its entry through 31 December 2010. Its main 
sections are devoted to China as respondent (Section II), complainant (Section III) 
and third party (Section IV), respectively. Each section explores China’s 
participation frequency and counterparties (or involved parties), as well as the 
subject matter and status of its disputes. Section V concludes. 
II. CHINA AS RESPONDENT 
A. The Transitional Period 
In terms of WTO dispute settlement statistics spanning from 1995 to 2010, China 
was a minor respondent, involved in only 21 of the 419 cases (roughly five per 
cent of all disputes). In contrast, the U.S. was the most challenged WTO Member 
(110 cases, or about 26 per cent), followed by the EU (70 cases, or about 17 per 
cent).3 This is not only because China is a late-comer to the WTO, but also 
because there was only one complaint against China in the first five years after 
accession. These first five years are generally referred to as the ‘transitional 
period.’ 
In the run up to WTO accession, China reached compromises—mainly with 
the European Communities (EC) and the U.S. —to delay the implementation of 
certain commitments concerning important industries. This was in accordance 
with China’s negotiation objective to make commitments consistent with its 
development status (e.g., commitments that would not be too harmful to China’s 
domestic industries).4 These transitional periods were to last between three and 
five years. 
For instance, in order to shield its automobile industry from growing foreign 
competition, China retained a system of car import quota licenses for three years. 
Similarly, China committed to grant rights to all domestic enterprises to import 
and export goods (‘the right to trade’) within three years after accession.5 The 
longest transitional period was five years and mainly applied to several 
commitments in the service sector. Within five years of accession, foreign 
3 WTO, Disputes by country/territory, available at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm>, accessed 4 January 2011. 
4 Other negotiation objectives for China included ‘developing country’ treatment within the WTO 
and an average bound import tariff level higher than the average of developed countries. 
5 Except for those goods listed in Annex 2A, which continue to be subject to state trading in 
accordance with the Protocol; See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 
WT/L/432 ( 23 November 2001), p. 4. 
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financial institutions would be permitted to provide services to all Chinese clients; 
there would be no geographic restrictions for telecommunication services, and 
wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries in the insurance sector would be permitted.6   
There was no explicit ‘peace clause’ that would have forbidden WTO 
Members to bring a complaint against China immediately after its accession. For 
commitments subject to transitional periods, potential complainants had to wait 
until the end of that period. With respect to other commitments, the first case 
could have been initiated on 11 December 2001.While in these cases there was no 
explicitly agreed-upon transitional period, there was a ‘de facto’ transition period. 
Legal authors such as Chad Bown considered that China had enjoyed a general 
five-year grace period following its accession. 7 
Several factors explain the existence of a de facto transition period, during 
which China remained free from litigation actions by other WTO Members. First, 
although China was already implementing major legal reforms during the 
accession negotiations, for instance, in the area of intellectual property (IP), China 
was (and still is) in a process of rapid change. In such an environment, deviations 
from WTO obligations during the reform process may be temporary, and could 
disappear once new regulation is fully implemented. WTO dispute settlement 
would be an ineffective way to enforce compliance when compliance is 
potentially imminent. Second, most WTO dispute settlement cases do not come 
from thin air or as a big surprise. They are the product of a long process, in which 
trade policy analysts systematically monitor foreign trade policy developments 
and identify the best cases, seasoned politicians and bureaucrats decide whether 
they are worth litigating, and experienced trade lawyers prepare for litigation. 
These ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ transitional periods were crucial in preventing 
the early rush to litigation against China. Since their expiry, other WTO Members 
have adopted a clear strategy to fully engage in formal WTO dispute settlement to 
manage bilateral trade tensions with Beijing. 8  Therefore, examining dispute 
settlement activity since 2006 provides the most relevant comparison between 
China and other WTO Members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
6 “WTO successfully concludes negotiations on China's entry”, WTO Press/243, 17 September 
2001.  
7 Chad P. Bown, U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the WTO, the Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs Vol., 33: I (2009), 45.  
8 Ibid., p. 45. 
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B. China Has Recently Emerged as the Leading Target In the WTO 
Disputes  
After the expiry of the transitional periods, as discussed above, China failed to 
bring some of its laws and regulations into conformity with the WTO Agreements 
or its Accession Protocol.9 This caused frequent challenges by the major trading 
powers, such as the U.S. and the EU. In the period between 2006 and 2010, China 
found itself a respondent in almost a quarter of all WTO disputes, receiving 
complaints roughly four times per year. In the past five years, the number of cases 
against China (20) was greater than that against the U.S. (19) and the EU (17). 
Other large emerging economies—Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Philippines, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey—have collectively been sued 
only nine times. From 2009 to 2010, China overtook the U.S. to become the most 
frequent respondent. Table 1 summarizes. 
Table 1: Top 3 Respondents and Other Large Emerging Economies, by Number 
of Cases: 2006-2010 
Respondent 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
China 3 4 5 4 4 20 
U.S. 5 3 6 3 2 19 
EU 3 3 4 4 3 17 
Other large emerging 
economies 3 1 1 3 1 9 
Total cases 20 13 19 14 21 87 
Share of cases with 
China as respondent 0.15 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.23 
Note: Cases are counted according to case numbers assigned by the WTO Secretariat. 
What could explain the high number of cases against China? First, China is 
a large economy with a huge market. In mid-2006, it surpassed the U.S. as the 
world’s second-largest exporter, and it overtook Germany as the world’s top 
exporter in 2009. Large economies face a large number of cases, just as the U.S. 
and the EU have experienced. 10  China can therefore expect a caseload 
9 It is interesting to note that the commitments embedded in China’s Accession Protocol have been 
a fertile source of disputes. Thus far, a vast majority of cases (17 out of 21) involved the Accession 
Protocol. The four cases which did not invoke the Accession Protocol include: China-Intellectual 
Property Rights (DS 362), China-Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel 
Fasteners from the European Union (DS 407), China-Electronic Payment Services (DS413) and 
China-GOES (DS 414).
10 John H. Jackson, “The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO”, in Deborah Z. Cass, Brett G. 
Williams and George R. Barker (eds.), China and the World Trading System: Entering the New 
Millennium (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 27.  
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commensurate to its importance in world trade. Second, a Member with a 
relatively large and rapidly growing economy will come under increased scrutiny 
from other WTO Members, who want to check whether this growth was attained 
through illegal shortcuts. Third, it has been simply impossible for China to 
implement in such a short period the enormous legal commitments associated 
with its WTO accession. China’s cultural tradition, legal concepts and economic 
norms diverge strikingly from those embedded in the WTO. As a WTO Member, 
China not only has to adhere to some 60 legally binding agreements, annexes, 
decisions and understandings adopted in the Uruguay Round negotiations, but 
also has to comply with its Accession Protocol. In order to implement these 
obligations, China enacted and (partially) amended 21 national laws related to 
trade. Between late 1999 and late 2006, China also adopted, revised or abolished 
about 100 administrative regulations, more than 1,000 ministerial regulations or 
policy measures, and about 200,000 local government regulations.11 Given the 
enormous task China faced, it is not surprising that some of the new measures 
would not perfectly match its WTO commitments.  
 
 
C. Counterparties: the U.S. and the EU Are the Major Complainants 
 
There are 21 WTO complaints naming China as respondent. The U.S. initiated 
more than half of these (11 cases), and the EU filed another four. Given its 
significant trade interests, it is not surprising that the U.S. is the top complainant. 
China is currently the second-largest U.S. trading partner, its third-largest export 
market, and its largest source of imports.12 
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, trade between the U.S. and China has 
grown rapidly, and this growth has been very unbalanced, with the U.S. 
merchandise trade deficit rising from $83 billion to $273 billion in 2010.13 In its 
2010 Report, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
considered that the U.S. trade deficit with China was a major drag on the U.S. 
economy and “posed unprecedented challenges to U.S. economic health and 
security”.14 The Commission simply attributed the trade deficit to the openness of 
                                                              
11 “Director of the Legislative Affairs Office of State Council, Cao Kangtai: The Major Adjustment 
of Trade Laws and Regulations Five Years after China’s Entry to the WTO”, Peoples’ Daily, 8 
December 2006.  
12 Please note this list does not consider the EU as a single economy; otherwise, the EU is the 
largest trading partner of the U.S., followed by Canada and China. 
13 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics: Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade 
Balance) with China (Washington, 12 January 2011), available at: 
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>.  
14 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Report to Congress of the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, November 2010), pp. 27-28.   
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the U.S. market and the lack of market access to China.15 In response to increased 
political pressure by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. government intensified the use of 
formal dispute settlement, in an effort to increase market access to China and 
eventually reduce this trade deficit. 
Except for the U.S., the EU is the most frequent complainant against China. 
Currently, the EU is China’s largest trading partner, largest export market, and 
largest source of technology import, while China is the EU’s second-largest 
trading partner. In 2009, China became the EU’s third-largest export market. The 
EU also has a large trade deficit in goods with China. However, the EU’s global 
trade deficit with the rest of the world is much smaller than that of the U.S.16 This 
might explain why the EU has challenged China less than the U.S. 
Interestingly, Japan, South Korea (hereafter “Korea”) and Chinese Taipei—
also China’s major trading partners—have never initiated any complaints against 
China in the WTO.17 This is partially because more than half of China’s exports 
are currently produced by foreign-invested enterprises, with companies in 
neighboring Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei playing a major role in this 
process.18 Also, these East Asian economies have had persistent bilateral trade 
surpluses with China. Furthermore, these societies are deeply influenced by 
Confucianism, and thus tend to use litigation as a last resort. Accordingly, Japan, 
Korea and Chinese Taipei are often third parties to complaints against China, but 
have never initiated any complaint against China.   
Notably, five of the 11 cases initiated by the U.S. and three of the four cases 
initiated by the EU grew into ‘joint complaints.’ Joint complainants can share 
information and strategies with each other, and thus increase their legal skills and 
decrease litigation costs. Mostly North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Member states (Canada on two occasions and Mexico on three occasions) as well 
as Guatemala (in one instance) have joined either the U.S. or the EU in a 
complaint against China. 
15 Ibid., p. 27.  
16 For example, the U.S.’s global trade balance in 2010 was -500,027 million dollars; while the 
EU’s global trade balance was -193 million dollars. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Trade in Goods 
and Services-Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis, (Washington, 9 June 2011), available at: 
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.txt>; “Euro zone trade surplus 
drops sharply in 2010”, People’s Daily Online, 15 February 2011. 
17  The absence of WTO disputes between mainland China and Chinese Taipei can also be 
explained by the particular circumstances of their political situation. 
18 European Commission, Facts and figures on EU-China trade (Brussels, 2009), available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144591.pdf>.  
223
The Law and Development Review, Vol. 4 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 6
DOI: 10.2202/1943-3867.1130
 
 
D. Subject Matter of Cases against China: Subsidies, Services and 
Investment Stand Out 
 
The WTO Secretariat tracks the main agreements at stake in each dispute 
settlement case and categorizes disputes according to four broad categories: (1) 
Goods: the GATT 1994 and agreements covered by its annex, such as the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); (2) Services: the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); (3) Intellectual property: the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); 
and (4)Dispute settlement: DSU.  
The cases against China substantially cover three trade sectors: goods, 
services and IP. The GATT 1994 dominated as the most frequently invoked 
agreement and was invoked in 16 cases, accounting for 35 per cent of all instances. 
The ASCM was invoked in ten cases (roughly 22 per cent). The GATS and 
TRIMS Agreement placed third and fourth, invoked in six cases (14 per cent) and 
five cases (13 per cent), respectively.  
Compared to other WTO Members, China has received a greater share of 
complaints focused on subsidies and rules related to services and investment. On 
the other hand, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and 
Agreement on Safeguards have never been invoked against China, despite 
invocation in five and four per cent, respectively, of all WTO disputes. These 
findings are summarized in Table 2, below. 
 
Table 2: Agreements Invoked in the Cases against China 
Agreement Category 
Invoked 
against China 
(number) 
Invoked 
against China 
(share of total) 
Invoked in all 
WTO cases 
(share of total) 
GATT 1994 Goods  16 0.35 0.39 
SCM Goods 10 0.22 0.10 
GATS Services 6 0.14 0.03 
TRIMS Goods 5 0.13 0.03 
Agriculture  Goods 3 0.07 0.08 
Anti-Dumping Goods 2 0.04 0.10 
TRIPS IP 2 0.04 0.03 
Rules of Origin  Goods 1 0.02 0.01 
TBT Goods 0 0 0.05 
Safeguards Goods 0 0 0.04 
Note 1: In most cases, more than one single agreement is invoked as the main ground for litigation  
Note 2: Figures in bold signify WTO Agreements that are relatively more (or less) invoked against 
China 
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What could explain complainants’ focus on subsidies, services and 
investment?  
z Subsidies and investment: China has frequently designed measures that 
potentially constitute subsidies or trade-related investment measures to develop 
domestic manufacturing capability or promote certain industries to produce 
domestic goods with greater added value. One example is the 2004 policy on 
Development of Automotive Industry, which was challenged in China-Auto Parts. 
Another example is the 2005 China-Grants, Loans and other Incentives dispute, 
in which measures to support the development of famous export brands were 
challenged. 19  
Furthermore, the industries that China supports are often those in which 
developed countries are or want to become competitive on the world market, such 
as the automotive industry and renewable energy sector. For instance, in 
December 2010, the U.S. brought a complaint against China’s financial support to 
wind power equipment manufacturers.  
z Services: Before China’s entry into the WTO, foreign participation in key 
service sectors, such as telecommunications, financial services and insurance, was 
nonexistent or marginal. By opening these service sectors through its WTO 
accession, China created high expectations among its trading partners that were 
not always met, especially in the first years following accession. 
During negotiations with the WTO, China’s accession team was mainly 
composed of representatives from the Ministry of Commerce. Border measures 
such as tariffs and quotas fall mainly under the competence of this Ministry 
whereas the regulation of service sectors is more complex and generally falls 
under the competence of several ministries and agencies. The Ministry of 
Commerce was not always fully aware of the implications of the market access 
and national treatment commitments it made to regulate service sectors, and other 
ministries and agencies were not always fully aware of WTO accession 
commitments. Without sufficient consultation with the relevant domestic 
regulators prior to its accession and continuous monitoring by the highest levels 
of the Chinese government, domestic regulators and other ministries may continue 
to issue rules and administrative guidance that reduce market access for foreign 
service providers to levels that fall short of China’s WTO commitments.20 
19 Chinese Ministry of Commerce et al., Guiding Opinions on Supporting the Development of 
Famous Export Brands (Beijing, 7 June 2005), available at: 
<http://wms.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xxfb/200506/20050600110961.html>.  
20 Nicholas Lardy, China & the World Trade Organization: Problems on the Road to Liberalization, 
Brookings Institution Press (Washington, January 2002).  
225
The Law and Development Review, Vol. 4 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 6
DOI: 10.2202/1943-3867.1130
 
 
E. China either Settled Cases Early or Lost, Often After the Appeal 
 
A typical completed case in the WTO dispute settlement process involves four 
main stages: consultations, panel process, appeal and implementation. At all 
phases of this process, countries in dispute are encouraged to consult each other in 
order to settle "out of court," and the WTO Director-General is available to offer 
his good offices, to mediate or to help achieve conciliation.21 An agreement could 
be reached between parties prior to a WTO ruling, which is known as "early 
settlement." Scholars have noted that this yields the most favorable policy 
outcome for WTO complainants.22 
 
1. China Shows Its Preference for Early Settlement 
 
Out of 21 complaints filed against China, 14 cases were closed or at the 
compliance stage as of 31 December 2010. Nine of the fourteen cases (about 64 
per cent) were settled during consultations or at the panel stage, but long before a 
WTO panel had reached any ruling (i.e., early settlement through diplomatic 
channels). Table 3 summarizes these findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
21 DSU, art.5. 
22 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 
37 Journal of World Trade 4 (2003), 720. 
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Table 3: China as Respondent: Closed Cases as of 31 December 2010 
Case 
No. Year Complainant  Subject Matter  Status 
Prevailing 
Party  
DS309 2004 U.S. 
Value-Added Tax on 
Integrated Circuits  MOU (2004) Settled 
DS339 2006 EU 
Measures on Import of 
Auto Parts 
AB Report 
(2008) 
EU, U.S. and 
Canada DS340 2006 U.S. 
DS342 2006 Canada  
DS358 2007 U.S. Refunds, Reductions or 
Exemptions from Taxes 
and other Payments  
Panel-MOU 
(2007) Settled DS359 2007 Mexico 
DS362 2007 U.S. 
The Protection and 
Enforcement of IPRs 
Panel Report 
(2009) U.S. 
DS363 2007 U.S. 
Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services  
AB Report 
(2009) U.S. 
DS372 2008 EU 
Financial Information 
Services  MOU (2008) Settled DS373 2008 U.S. 
DS378 2008 Canada  
DS387 2008 U.S. Grants, Loans and Other 
Incentives 
Consultation-
Agreement 
reached 
Settled 
DS388 2008 Mexico 
In seven of the nine cases that ended in early settlement, China agreed to 
withdraw or modify its allegedly WTO-inconsistent measures prior to reaching 
the panel stage. The remaining two cases were settled soon after the panel was 
established:  
• China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (DS309): Arriving in 
March 2004, this was the first complaint that the U.S. filed against China. About 
two months later, the parties settled the dispute through a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU). According to the MOU, China was to stop providing 
value added tax refunds on integrated circuits produced domestically (or designed 
domestically but produced abroad). 23 
• China-Taxes (DS358, 359): In February 2007, the U.S. and Mexico 
requested consultations with China concerning measures granting refunds, 
reductions or exemptions from taxes and other payments. One month later, China 
adopted a new income tax law, and the U.S. and Mexico lost their main complaint 
target. A panel was established in August 2007, but the parties reached mutually 
agreed solutions well before the issuance of the panel report. 
23 Memorandum of Understanding between China and the United States Regarding China’s Value-
Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/7(16 July 2004).  
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• China-Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign 
Suppliers (DS372, 373, 378): The U.S., the EU and Canada signed a MOU with 
China in 2008, the same year that this complaint was filed. The memorandum 
stipulates that foreign financial information suppliers would no longer be required 
to supply their services through an agent. Additionally, Xinhua News Agency 
would no longer be the regulator in charge of financial information services. 
Furthermore, confidential information provided to the regulator by foreign 
suppliers was to receive adequate protection, in accordance with China’s laws and 
regulations.24  
• China-Grants, Loans and Other Incentives (DS387, 388, 390): The U.S., 
Guatemala and Mexico worked cooperatively with China to reach a mutually 
agreed settlement in December 2009, under which China confirmed the 
termination of several subsidies that had supported the export of “famous brand” 
merchandise.25 
In general, China was prone to concede to demands from counterparties and 
agreed to withdraw or modify its allegedly WTO-inconsistent measures within a 
year after the first consultation. China could have allowed its domestic industry 
more time to adjust by continuing litigation instead of relenting.26 In the interim, 
China could have articulated its own interpretation of the often vague WTO 
provisions. However, it did not do so. 
 
2. China Has Gained Limited Success  
 
In the other five closed cases that did not reach early settlement, China appealed 
four panel reports. The outcome of each of these cases is described below. 
• China-Auto Parts (DS 339, 340, 342): In this case, China for the first 
time exhausted DSU procedures through the Appellate Body stage. Sadly for 
China, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that Chinese tariffs imposed 
on imported auto parts were illegal under WTO rules. China implemented the 
DSB rulings in the agreed reasonable period of time. 
                                                              
24 Memorandum of Understanding between the People's Republic of China and the European 
Communities Regarding Measures Affecting Foreign Suppliers of Financial Information Services, 
WT/DS372/4 (9 December 2008). 
25 Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Wins End to China’s “Famous 
Brand” Subsidies after Challenge at WTO; Agreement Levels Playing Field for American Workers 
in Every Manufacturing Sector (Washington, 18 December 2009), available at: 
<http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/18/us-china/>.  
26 The average time span between the establishment of a panel and the expiry of the reasonable 
period of time is 775 days, or over two years. If one begins counting from the request for 
consultations, the average period grows to 1,507 days, or over four years. See Diagnosis of the 
Problems Affecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Some Ideas by Mexico, TN/DS/W/90 (16 
July 2007). 
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• China-Audiovisual Services (DS363): In this case, the Appellate Body 
upheld the Panel’s main finding that China’s restrictions on the entitlement to 
import publications and audiovisual entertainment products were inconsistent 
with China’s Accession Protocol, China’s Accession Working Party Report, the 
GATS and the GATT 1994. 
• China-Intellectual Property Rights (DS362): China did not appeal the 
Panel report in this case, and its active defense brought limited success. The Panel 
did not uphold one of the four U.S. claims, finding that the U.S. has not 
established that criminal thresholds were inconsistent with China’s obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement.27 The agreed twelve-month reasonable period of 
time for China to implement the DSB rulings expired on 20 March 2010.28 
Until now, China suffered defeat in almost every case that was not settled. 
Almost all of China’s measures at issue were found to be inconsistent with WTO 
rules by the Panel or Appellate Body, requiring China to bring these measures 
into conformity with its obligations under the WTO agreements.  
Nevertheless, continuing dispute settlement through the Appellate Body 
stage has advantages over early settlement. First, it has allowed China to delay the 
implementation of measures during the duration of the dispute settlement process. 
Thereafter, a reasonable period of time (ranging from over seven months to 14 
months) has been allowed for China’s implementation of the DSB 
recommendations and rulings. Second, active defense has been useful for China to 
gain dispute settlement experience and train its lawyers. 
III. CHINA AS COMPLAINANT 
A. China Has Been Relatively Inactive as Complainant, but Is Transitioning 
Toward Assertiveness  
The most active WTO complainants in the studied period were the U.S. and the 
EU, with 97 and 82 cases, respectively. In other words, these Members filed 
complaints, on average, roughly six times per year (once every two months) since 
27  China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS362/R (26 January 2009), p. 134.  
28  China contended that it had completed all necessary domestic legislative procedures for 
implementing the DSB recommendations and rulings, while the U.S. said it was not yet in a 
position to share China’s claim that it had implemented the DSB recommendations and rulings. On 
8 April 2010, China and the U.S. notified the DSB of agreed procedures under Articles 21 and 22 
of the DSU; See WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS362 China — Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, available at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm>, accessed 7 July 2011.  
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the establishment of the WTO. In contrast, China only initiated seven complaints 
after nine years of WTO membership. This means China initiated less than one 
case per year. Till December 2010, many other developing economies in the 
WTO complained more frequently than China. For instance, Brazil brought 1.7 
cases per year to the WTO, Mexico 1.4, India 1.3, and Argentina 1. Table 4 below 
shows the most active litigants from 1995 through 2010. 
 
Table 4: Complaint Rate of Active Litigants 1995 – 2010 (Top 13)29 
WTO 
Member 
No. of 
Complaints 
(A) 
No. of  being 
Respondent 
(B) 
Cases 
initiated 
per year 
(average)  
Cases 
defended 
per year 
(average) 
Complaint 
Rate 
(R) 
US 97 110 6.5 7.3 0.47 
EU 82 70 5.5 4.7 0.54 
Canada 33 16 2.2 1.1 0.67 
Brazil 25 14 1.7 0.9 0.64 
Mexico 21 14 1.4 0.9 0.60 
India 19 20 1.3 1.3 0.49 
Argentina 15 17 1 1.1 0.47 
Korea 14 14 0.9 0.9 0.50 
Japan 14 15 0.9 1 0.48 
Thailand 13 3 0.9 0.2 0.81 
Chile 10 13 0.7 0.9 0.43 
Guatemala 8 2 0.5 0.1 0.8 
China 7 21 0.8 2.3 0.26 
Note: The complaint rate is equal to the number of complaints filed, divided by the number of 
instances as a party to a dispute (R = A / (A + B)). 
 
Prima facie, China’s number of complaints is extremely low for a major 
trading power. Based on the results of a probabilistic model, Horn found that the 
U.S. and the EU tend to initiate more trade disputes mainly because they are 
involved in more trade—with a wider variety of trading partners—than other 
WTO Members.30 Therefore, one could expect China’s participation in the WTO 
dispute settlement system to increase in parallel with its share in world trade. 
In simple terms, China’s huge complaint deficit in the WTO signals that the 
country bites others much less frequently than it is bitten. The complaint rate 
indicates whether a WTO Member is active or passive in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. It is equal to the number of complaints a Member has filed, 
                                                              
29 The countries in the table are those initiated more complaints in the WTO than China including 
China; see WTO, supra note 3.  
30  Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis and Hakan Nordstom, Is the Use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System Biased?, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2340 (1999). 
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divided by the number of instances in which it has been a party to a dispute. A 
figure of 0.5 means that a Member has ‘legal status balance’ in its utilization of 
the WTO DSM (i.e., this Member filed one complaint, and was also a respondent 
in one case). It can be seen from Table 4 that most Members have a complaint rate 
of about 0.5. China has the lowest complaint rate, 0.26, which is much lower than 
that of many other developing countries, for instance, the complaint rate of Brazil 
is 0.64, and Thailand’s rate reaches 0.81. 
There are several reasons for China’s relative inactivity in the WTO DSM. 
First, deeply influenced by non-litigious legal traditions, China prefers to settle 
disputes behind closed doors, without a public ‘loss of face’ for either party. 
Second, China’s legal capacity is relatively low in comparison to that of 
developed countries, such as the U.S. and the EU, and even some emerging 
economies like Brazil. In these countries, there is a long tradition of formal 
litigation in courts, and an abundance of lawyers who are proficient in the WTO 
official languages (English, French and Spanish). Third, many countries have 
developed formal and informal private and public partnerships to identify foreign 
trade barriers, prioritize them according to their impact, and mobilize resources 
for WTO complaints. China does not yet have such strong and effective 
mechanisms. Finally, China’s accession package greatly limits the country’s right 
to complain, imposing discriminatory limits to market access for Chinese goods in 
foreign markets:  
• China agreed to a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism 
(TPSSM), allowing other WTO Members to impose restrictions on Chinese 
imports when it causes or threatens to cause market disruption rather than serious 
injury to the domestic industry for 12 years after accession. 31  
• China also accepted a discriminatory provision in anti-dumping cases 
brought against its goods in other markets—allowing the importing WTO 
Member to use a methodology not based on a strict comparison to domestic prices 
or costs in China—until 10 December 2016.32  
• WTO Member reservations incorporated in the accession protocol also 
inhibit China from initiating WTO complaints. For example, Mexico listed some 
measures—subject to neither WTO Agreement provisions nor the anti-dumping 
provisions of the accession protocol—that would remain in effect for six years 
following China’s accession.33 
Accordingly, before 2007, China initiated only one complaint against the 
U.S., joining the EU, Japan and Korea as co-complainant in a dispute over U.S. 
safeguards covering imported steel. 
31 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 2001), 
section 16.  
32 Ibid. ,section 15. 
33 Ibid., annex 7.  
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However, facing rising protectionism and a distressed export sector, China 
soon realized that the cultural asset of non-litigious mores is not entirely 
compatible with the defense of Chinese trade and economic interests and the 
ability to influence trade rules through dispute settlement. In 2007, China filed its 
first independent complaint against the U.S., concerning preliminary anti-
dumping and countervailing duty determinations. Since then, China has resorted 
to the WTO every year. In 2009 alone, China filed three independent complaints.  
 
 
B. Counterparties: China Has So Far Targeted Only the U.S. and the EU  
 
All of China’s complaints are against the U.S. and the EU because they are 
currently China’s largest export markets and largest sources of technology 
imports. Further, in terms of litigation retaliation, filing a case against a country 
increases the likelihood that the respondent will file a complaint against the 
original complainant. In the studied period, the U.S. initiated 11 cases against 
China, and the EU initiated four; China initiated five complaints against the U.S 
and two against the EU. This suggests that China’s complaints, vis-à-vis the U.S. 
and the EU, are commensurate with the number of cases brought against it.  
China has never initiated any complaint against other major developing 
country, despite the fact that some such countries have become remarkably active 
in their anti-dumping policies against China. Between 1 January 1995 and 30 June 
2010, India filed 137 anti-dumping complaints against China, which is more than 
any other WTO Member, including the U.S. (101) and the EU (96). Turkey (57), 
Argentina (53) and Brazil (41) are also top anti-dumping users against China.34 A 
reason for China’s passive attitude towards developing countries could be the 
aforementioned special provisions or reservations in China’s accession protocol, 
which allow trading partners to use anti-dumping and safeguards against Chinese 
exports with almost no restraint. 
 
 
C. China Challenges Its Non-market Economy Treatment 
 
GATT 1994 is the most frequently invoked agreement (44 per cent) by China, 
followed by the Anti-dumping Agreement (25 per cent), Agreement on SCM (13 
per cent), the Agreements on Agriculture (6 per cent), Safeguards (6 per cent) and 
SPS (6 per cent). Table 5, below, provides specific supporting data. All of China’s 
complaints concern trade in goods and do not involve conditions of service supply 
                                                              
34 WTO, Anti-dumping Measures: Reporting Member vs. Exporting Country 01/01/1995- 
31/12/2010, available at: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_meas_rep_exp_e.pdf>, 
accessed 15 January 2011.  
232
Zhuang: An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
in other countries or any IP regime. This can be explained by China’s current 
composition of exports, which are largely goods with low added value and a low 
level of IP content. Trade remedies are the most contentious issue. Over half of 
China’s complaints (four out of seven) concern the U.S. and the EU anti-dumping 
measures, and another two complaints target U.S. safeguards. 35 
Table 5: Agreements Invoked by China 
Agreement Category  
Invoked  
by China  
(number) 
Invoked  
by China  
(share of total)  
Invoked in all 
WTO cases 
(share of total) 
GATT 1994 Goods 7 0.44 0.39 
Anti-
Dumping Goods 4 0.25 0.1 
SCM Goods 2 0.13 0.1 
Agriculture Goods 1 0.06 0.08 
Safeguards Goods 1 0.06 0.04 
SPS Goods 1 0.06 0.04 
Non-market economy (NME) status is the main source of frequent trade 
remedy investigations against China, which places China at a considerable 
disadvantage in anti-dumping actions.36 Around one third of the WTO Members, 
including the U.S. and the EU, have not recognized China’s market economy 
status so far.37 In the WTO framework, Members are explicitly allowed to treat 
NME countries differently from market economies in anti-dumping cases. 38
Further, as mentioned above, China’s accession protocol allows other WTO 
Members to apply non-market methodologies in their antidumping investigations 
against allegedly dumped Chinese exports for 15 years following accession. 
Accordingly, WTO Members frequently take advantage of the opportunity 
to disregard China’s costs of production and sales prices. Instead, they often 
choose a surrogate country with a market economy near the same level of 
development as China, but where costs and local prices are much higher than in 
China. This increases the likelihood of a determination of ‘dumping’. It permits 
other countries to easily erect tariff barriers to China’s exports. Consequently, 
products originating in China are subject to higher (and sometimes prohibitive) 
35See table 6 below. 
36 According to UNCTAD, an NME is an economy in which the government seeks to determine 
economic activity largely through a mechanism of central planning, as was the case in the former 
Soviet Union. In contrast, a market economy depends heavily upon market forces to allocate 
productive resources. See UNCTAD, UNCTAD Automated Systems for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), 
Glossary of Customs Terms, available at: <http://www.asycuda.org>, accessed 29 January 2011. 
37 “China, U.S. to Further Discuss China’s Market Economy Status”, People’s Daily Online, 25 
May 2010.  
38 GATT 1994, art.VI. 
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anti-dumping duties. Resort to WTO litigation is the most important means to 
safeguard the interests of China’s export enterprise. In the short run, China aims 
to remove market barriers for a particular product; at a more systemic level, China 
challenges its NME treatment by the U.S. and the EU.  
Between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. applied only one global safeguard (to 
steel products).It was subsequently challenged by several WTO Members, 
including China. In the same time period, the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) conducted seven China-specific safeguard investigations under 
Section 421, finding violations in five instances.39  In 2009, President Obama 
decided to impose import duties of 35 per cent in the first year on Chinese 
passenger and light truck tires, which would decrease to 30 per cent in the second 
year and 25 per cent in the third. This is the first time that the U.S imposed 
"market disruption” safeguards on imports from China and the measure was 
subsequently challenged by China in the US-Tire dispute. 
Section 421 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 was added to U.S. trade law by 
the US-China Relations Act of 2000. It implements TPSSM—contained in 
Section 16 of China’s Accession Protocol—until December 2013, and authorizes 
the President to impose safeguards on Chinese goods if domestic market 
disruption is found. Under Section 421, market disruption occurs whenever 
imports of a Chinese product that is like or directly competitive with a domestic 
product increase rapidly, so as to be a significant cause or threat of material injury 
to the domestic industry. Section 421 has a lower threshold for demonstrating 
possible harm and securing temporary relief.  
 
 
D. The Difficulty of Substantially Prevailing Over the U.S. 
 
This portion of the article depicts the current status of China’s complaints. By the 
end of 2010, all of them moved to Panel proceedings except U.S.-Coated Free 
Sheet Paper (DS 368). Three cases were closed. One panel report was appealed, 
and the other two panel reports were circulated. Table 6 below provides a 
complete overview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
39 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jared C. Woollacott, Trade Disputes Between China and the United 
States: Growing Pains so Far, Worse Ahead?, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Working Paper Series 10-17 (December 2010), p. 22. 
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Table 6: China as Complainant 
Case 
No. Year 
Respo- 
ndent Subject Matter  
Status  
(31 December 2010) 
DS252 2002 U.S. 
U.S. Safeguard Measures on 
Steel Imports  
AB report (2003) favors 
China  
DS368 2007 U.S. 
Dumping & Subsidies-Coated 
Paper  Terminated (2007) 
DS379 2008 U.S. 
Dumping & Subsidies-Certain 
Products  
Panel report (2010) favors 
U.S.; appealed 
DS392 2009 U.S. Denial of Poultry Imports  
Panel report (2010) favors 
China; adopted   
DS397 2009 EU 
Dumping-Iron & Steel 
Fasteners  
Panel report (2010) favors 
China; circulated 
DS399 2009 U.S. Safeguard-Tire Imports 
Panel report (2010) favors 
U.S.; circulated  
DS405 2010 EU Dumping-Footwear Imports  Panel established (2010) 
1. Case Terminated Before the Panel Proceedings 
In 2007, China filed its first independent complaint, U.S.-Coated Free Sheet 
Paper (DS368), which indicated that the Chinese government’s attitude towards 
WTO litigation had changed. However, it was a short-lived dispute because China 
filed the challenge prematurely, suggesting that China still lacked experience and 
legal acumen.40 
In the U.S., anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations are carried 
out by two agencies: the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the 
Department of Commerce (the Department)—which investigates allegations of 
sales below fair value in anti-dumping cases, and the existence of subsidies in 
countervailing duty cases—and the ITC, which investigates injury allegations. If 
both agencies make affirmative final determinations, an anti-dumping or 
countervailing duty order imposes an additional duty on targeted merchandise 
equivalent to the ‘dumping margin’ or amount of subsidy. 41  
Following petitions filed by NewPage Corporation on behalf of the 
domestic industry concerning imports of coated free sheet papers from China, 
Indonesia and Korea, the Department initiated anti-dumping duty investigations in 
November 2006. One month later, the ITC preliminarily determined that there was 
a reasonable indication that imports of coated free sheet paper from the above 
40 This is fundamentally different from early settlement because this case terminated not as a result 
of agreement between parties, but rather because the U.S. had not yet imposed measures that could 
violate the WTO Agreements. 
41 Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedies and the WTO Rules Negotiations, CRS Report for Congress, 
R40606 (7 June 2010), p. 4. 
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mentioned countries had been materially injuring the U.S. industry.42 In May 2007, 
the Department preliminarily determined that coated free sheet paper from China 
was being, or was likely to be, sold in the U.S. at less than fair value.43 The 
Department reached a final affirmative determination in October 2007 that China 
had been providing countervailing subsidies to its domestic producers and 
exporters of coated free sheet paper.44 Yet, the ITC issued in December 2007 a 
final determination that no industry in the U.S. had been materially injured or 
threatened with material injury, and that the establishment of industry in the U.S. 
had not been materially retarded.45  Countervailing duties were not ultimately 
imposed in this specific case, and thus China’s complaint terminated dramatically 
prior to the panel stage.  
 
2. China Gained Victories in Three Disputes  
 
Through 2010, there are three rulings in favor of China in the WTO DSM.  
z U.S.-Steel Safeguards (DS252): This case was initially filed by the EU. 
Eight other Members, including China, joined at a later stage. China fully 
participated in the Panel and Appellate Body proceedings. The Panel and 
Appellate Body ruled in favor of the complainants. For China, this victory has not 
been significant, because its steel exports to the U.S. remain quite small; in fact, 
China is a net importer of steel.46 
z U.S.-Poultry (DS392): The measure primarily at issue was Section 727 of 
the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, which effectively prohibits the 
establishment or implementation of any measures that would allow Chinese 
poultry to be imported into the U.S. by denying the use of any U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) funds for this purpose. The Panel ruled in China’s favor in 
September 2009, but did not recommend that the DSB request the U.S. to bring 
the measure at issue into conformity with its obligations, as Section 727 had 
already expired. In other words, China won this case, but it seems the outcome 
confirmed that the bill that had expired violated WTO trade rules.  
                                                              
42 Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea, Order by the International Trade 
Commission, 71 FR 64983 (29 December 2006), summary. 
43 Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, Preliminary Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination by the International Trade 
Administration, 72 FR 30758 (4 June 2007), summary. 
44 Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination by the International Trade Administration, E7-21046 (25 October 2007), 
summary.  
45 Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea, Final Order by the International 
Trade Commission, E7-24103 (7 December, 2007), para. 1. 
46 Hiro Lee and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Quantitative Assessments of U.S. Safeguards on 
Steel Products, Discussion Paper Series from Kobe University No. 160 (July 2004), p. 15.  
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z EC-Fasteners (DS397): This case, the first against the EU, can be 
considered China’s biggest victory. The Panel condemned the EU’s anti-dumping 
practice vis-à-vis exporters of alleged NMEs. Under the EU’s regulation, anti-
dumping duties were specified for the supplying country concerned and not for 
each supplier. Individual dumping margins were only specified for exporters that 
demonstrated their independence from the State.47 The Panel found that there was 
no basis in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement to condition the granting of an 
individual margin and duty rate on compliance with “individual treatment”, and 
thus Article 9.5 of the Anti Dumping Regulation violated WTO law. The amount 
of money involved in this case is not significant, but the ruling may force the EU 
to rethink and modify existing discriminatory legal provisions and specific 
methods in its trade remedy investigations. The EU or China might appeal but at 
this moment neither party has done so.48 
3. The Rulings Against China 
The WTO Panels ruled against China in its complaints concerning the U.S.’s non-
market economy treatment and product-specific safeguards. China appealed these 
two Panel reports.  
z U.S.-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (DS379): In this case, the 
WTO panel ruled in favor of the U.S. and upheld the right of the U.S. to impose 
both anti-dumping duties and countervailing duty measures on a range of Chinese 
imports. On 1 December 2010, China appealed. As of this writing, the Appellate 
Body is still considering this case. 
z U.S.-Tires (DS399): China challenged the U.S.’s additional duties 
imposed on imports of Chinese tires through the TPSSM. The Panel ruled in favor 
of the U.S. and rejected all of China’s claims. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
said it would “carefully examine the dispute settlement panel’s report and appeal 
at an appropriate time to protect Chinese industries’ legal rights and interests.”49 
Overall, in sharp contrast to the early settlement rate (64 per cent) when 
China was challenged, none of China’s complaints reached early settlement. This 
does not help China gain adequate concessions from its respondents. Moreover, 
those WTO-inconsistent measures were maintained for at least the entire dispute 
47 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries 
not Members of the European Community (the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation), L 343/51, 30 
November 2009, art. 9.5. 
48 In February 2010, China initiated the second complaint against the EU concerning similar 
antidumping duties imposed on shoes. As of this writing, the panel proceeding is ongoing, but the 
outcome of the EU-Fasteners dispute might have impact on the development of this case. 
49 Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the Speech on the US-Tire Panel Report by the Officer in 
Charge in the Rules and Law Department (Beijing, 14 December2010), available at: 
<http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/mymcyd/subjectss/201012/20101207305703.html>.  
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settlement proceedings without any compensation for the harm done to Chinese 
industry. China also found it difficult to change its NME treatment and the U.S. 
product-specific safeguard, but it succeeded in challenging the EU’s individual 
treatment regime in the initial DSB ruling. 
 
 
IV. CHINA AS A THIRD PARTY  
 
 
A. China Has Been a Hyperactive Third Party, but With a Declining Third 
Party Participation Rate 
 
The DSU allows any WTO Member to participate as a third party during 
consultations and at the litigation stage when it believes a ‘substantial interest’ is 
at stake.50 Third parties are entitled to make written submissions to the Panel, 
present an oral submission at a hearing, and receive all the original written 
submissions of the parties in a timely manner.51  
During the studied period, Japan topped the list and participated in 102 
cases as a third party, followed by the EU (98 cases) and the U.S. (80 cases). 
China participated in 71 WTO cases as a third party, ranking fourth among the 
153 WTO Members. When we take into account China´s recent accession, China 
has been the most active third party in the WTO with around eight cases per year, 
whereas Japan has been third party to about seven cases a year. Table 7 illustrates 
these findings below. 
The third party participation rate illustrates how often a WTO Member 
participates as a third party in cases where it is eligible.52 It is the share of actual 
third party cases among the total number of potential third party cases (i.e., cases 
to which a given WTO Member is not party). Between the establishment of the 
WTO and December 2010, 419 disputes were initiated in the WTO. The U.S., for 
example, was a party in 207 instances. Theoretically, the U.S. could have been a 
third party in the remaining 212 cases. In fact, it joined as a third party in 80 such 
cases. Therefore, the U.S.’s third party participation rate is 0.38 (80/212). For the 
other founding WTO Members, a similar calculation method applies. 
 
 
 
                                                              
50 DSU, art(s).4 .11, 10.2 and 17.4.  
51 DSU, art. 10.  
52 Any WTO Member can become a third party to a dispute, generally by simply indicating that it 
has an interest in the subject matter. Hence, a WTO Member could be a third party to all WTO 
cases except those in which it is a party. 
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Table 7: Most Active Third Parties in the WTO DSM (Top 8) 
WTO Member Japan EU U.S. Canada China India Brazil Mexico
Complainant 
(total) 14 82 97 33 7 19 25 21 
Respondent (total) 15 70 110 16 21 20 14 14 
Third Party 
(total) 102 98 80 71 67 63 61 55 
Third party (per 
year) 7 7 5 5 8 4 4 4 
Potential third 
party cases 390 267 212 370 149 380 380 384 
Third party 
participation rate 0.26 0.37 0.38 0.19 0.45 0.17 0.16 0.14 
Note: Third party participation rate = total number of cases in which a WTO Member is a third 
party / potential third party cases. 
However, China is not a founding Member, and only those cases following 
its accession need to be taken into account to enable comparison with the 
founding WTO Members. From the first dispute after China’s accession (DS 243) 
to the last dispute in 2010 (DS 419), there were 177 complaints. Out of these 177 
cases, China participated as a party in 28 instances. Therefore, the total number of 
potential third party cases was equal to 149 (177–28) cases. China was a third 
party in 71 cases, of which four cases were initiated before its accession. For the 
purpose of calculating the third party participation rate, these four cases are 
excluded. Thus, China’s participation rate was 0.45 (67/149).  
The analysis reveals that China has been the most active third party 
(participation rate is 0.45), followed by the U.S. (0.38) and the EU (0.37). Various 
reasons for China’s high rate of third party participation exist. First, China has an 
economic interest to closely follow trade disputes potentially affecting its access 
to other WTO Members’ markets. Second, when there is no direct economic 
effect, China may still have a systemic interest if the interpretation of a WTO rule 
or procedure potentially affects its future trade interests. Third, China may obtain 
information that could be useful for trade policy reforms. Finally, China could 
gain litigation experience and train its lawyers and governmental officials through 
third party participation. 
Nevertheless, China’s third party participation rate has been decreasing over 
time. In the first two years following its accession, China participated as a third 
party in 36 disputes, which is more than half of its total participation since 
accession. From 2004 to 2006, it participated as a third party in 25 cases. Between 
2007 and 2008, its participation dramatically declined to once per year. In the 
most recent two years studied, participation was four times per year.53 A clear 
53 According to the year in which China notified the DSB to join as a third party, China joined 18 
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trend can be discerned: the number of third party cases has declined between 2002 
and 2008 and has remained stable at about four cases a year, whereas the number 
of cases to which China is party increased from zero to a level of around five 
cases per year since 2006 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: China’s Participation in the WTO DSM: Third party vs. Party: 2002-2010 
 
 
This pattern could be explained as follows. First, if a WTO Member is a 
party to a dispute, it cannot be a third party. Second, China soon adjusted its 
litigation strategy. According to an official of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
three stages can be discerned. In the first phase, the ‘latent observer’ period (from 
accession to July 2003), China only participated in three out of 26 panel 
proceedings in which it was a third party. In the second stage (or ‘full observer’ 
period, from August 2003 to early 2007), China participated in all Panel 
proceedings. From 2007 onward—the current ‘strategic observer’ period—China 
has only selected important cases for third party participation.54 
 
 
B. Trade Partners Monitored by China: the U.S., the EU, Korea and Mexico 
Stand Out 
 
Through third party participation, China has observed 26 trade partners, including 
American, Asian and European countries. The U.S. has been monitored the most 
(44 instances), followed by the EU (30 instances). The U.S. and the EU were 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cases per year in 2002 and 2003, ten in 2004, six in 2005, nine in 2006, one per year in 2007 and 
2008, and four per year in 2009 and 2010. See WTO, supra note 3. 
54 Wenhua Ji, Commentary on China’s Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement Activities in 2007, 
2 Journal of International Economic Law (2008), 298. 
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party to 61 of the 71 cases in which China was involved as a third party. 55 Korea 
and Mexico tied for third on China’s monitoring list, each with 10 instances. 
China has also shown interest in disputes between Korea and Japan.  
This reflects China’s status as a major trading country that has a wide range 
of trading partners. Meanwhile, China has trade interests in the disputes involving 
major trade partners and competitors, such as the U.S., the EU, Korea and Mexico. 
For example, China is a large textile exporter to the U.S.. U.S. rules of origin for 
textiles greatly impact China’s exports. In U.S.-Textiles Rules of Origin, initiated 
by India, China expressed its interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Rules of 
Origin, arguing the WTO inconsistency of the U.S. rules. In Korea-Commercial 
Vessels, initiated by the EU, China participated as a third party because it has a 
large shipbuilding industry; a decision on Korean subsidies would potentially 
affect China’s subsidy policy.  
C. China Is Learning to Deal with Anti-dumping and Subsidies Cases 
As a third party, China has primarily been involved in cases where agreements 
related to trade in goods were invoked (95 per cent). GATT 1994 is still the 
predominant agreement involved (42 per cent). The Agreement on SCM and the 
Anti-dumping Agreement also stand out (13 and 11 per cent, respectively), 
followed by the Agreements on Agriculture (eight per cent), SPS (six per cent), 
Safeguards (four per cent) and TBT (four per cent). Table 8 below provides an 
overview of the Agreements invoked by the complainant in cases where China 
was a third party. 
One of the main areas of litigation against China has been subsidies, as 
observed in Section II. Anti-dumping and safeguards have been the major focus of 
China’s complaints, as observed in Section III. Building up litigation experience 
and acquiring knowledge of these three areas from other countries have been 
motivating factors behind China’s active involvement as a third party. In addition, 
China has demonstrated its interest in some new areas—such as import licensing 
procedures and customs valuation—so as to prepare itself for future involvement.  
However, in comparison to the share of different agreements invoked in all 
WTO cases, China’s third party participation does not reveal a specific interest in 
certain agreements.  
55 13 of the 61 disputes were between the U.S. and the EU.
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Table 8: China as a Third party —Agreements Invoked by the Complainant  
Agreement Category  
Invoked by 
complainant 
(number) 
Invoked by 
complainant  
(share of 
total)  
Invoked in all WTO 
cases (share of 
total) 
GATT 1994 Goods  66 0.42 0.39 
SCM Goods 20 0.13 0.1 
Antidumping Goods 17 0.11 0.1 
Agriculture Goods 13 0.08 0.08 
SPS Goods 9 0.06 0.04 
Safeguards Goods 7 0.04 0.04 
TBT Goods 7 0.04 0.05 
DSU DSU 4 0.03 0.01 
Import 
Licensing 
Procedures  
Goods 3 0.02 0.04 
Rules of 
Origin Goods 3 0.02 0.01 
Customs 
Valuation Goods 2 0.01 0.02 
TRIPS IP 2 0.01 0.03 
TRIMS Goods 2 0.01 0.03 
GATS Services 1 0.01 0.03 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The study has shown how a major developing country has used the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Through December 2010, China was a party in 28 of the 419 
WTO cases. Since 2007, the annual share of cases involving China as a party has 
been about one third. Half of the 2009 disputes included China as a party.56 
Therefore, whether active or passive, China has become a frequent user of the 
WTO DSM. This demonstrates China’s trust towards the rules-based world 
trading system, and its willingness to peacefully settle international trade disputes 
through an independent third party under internationally agreed-upon rules.  
As a late arrival to the WTO, China has recently emerged as its most 
frequent respondent. The U.S. and the EU have been the major complainants 
against China, in 11 and four cases, respectively. The main subject matter of the 
                                                              
56Between 2006 and 2010, the number of WTO cases per year was 20, 13, 19, 14 and 17, 
respectively. The number of cases involving China as a party was three, five, six, seven and five, 
respectively. Hence, China’s annul participation rate was 15, 38, 32, 50 and 29 per cent, 
respectively.  
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complaints filed against China has been subsidies, services and trade-related 
investment measures. Many of these cases have involved industries that China 
wished to protect through transitional periods, such as automotive, financial and 
distribution services. As a respondent, China seems to have preferred to settle 
disputes through negotiation and compromise, rather than adjudication.  
China has been a relatively inactive complainant, but is on its way to 
assertiveness. Almost all the seven complaints initiated by China targeted U.S. 
and EU trade remedies (i.e., anti-dumping and safeguard measures). China did not 
reach early settlement in any of its complaints against the U.S. or the EU. China 
also found it difficult to change its NME treatment and the U.S. product-specific 
safeguard, but it succeeded in challenging the EU’s individual treatment regime in 
the initial DSB ruling. 
Since its accession, China has become the WTO’s most active third party. 
As its direct involvement in WTO dispute settlement has increased, China’s third 
party participation rate has recently declined. The main trade powers monitored 
by China have been the U.S. and the EU. Mexico and Korea have also stood out 
in this regard. As a third party, China has shown a strong interest in disputes 
concerning anti-dumping and subsidies. 
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